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Abstract
The recent FATF Recommendations defines virtual assets and virtual assets service
providers (VASP), and requires under the Travel Rule that originating VASPs obtain and
hold required and accurate originator information and required beneficiary information
on virtual asset transfers. In this paper we discuss the notion of key ownership evidence
as a core part of originator and beneficiary information required by the FATF Recommen-
dation. We discuss approaches to securely communicate the originator and beneficiary
information between VASPs, and review existing standards for public key certificates as
applied to VASPs and virtual asset transfers. We propose the notion of a trust net-
work of VASPs in which originator and beneficiary information, including key ownership
information, can be exchanged securely while observing individual privacy requirements.
Keywords: virtual asset; virtual asset service provider; blockchain; public-key certifi-
cates; key management.
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1 Introduction
Since the emergence of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency system [1] over a decade ago there has
been a growing interest in the use of blockchain technology as the basis for the exchange
various types of virtual assets beyond the original Bitcoin cryptocurrency [2, 3, 4]. More
recently, in 2018 the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) provided a definition of virtual
assets and their service providers, placing cryptocurrency exchanges under the category of
virtual asset service providers (VASP). One implication, among others, is that the existing
FATF regulatory framework applies to these exchanges, and that exchanges must obtain and
hold originator and beneficiary information in the case of virtual asset transfers.
In this paper we review the use of existing standards in the area of public key certificates
and certificate management in the context of virtual asset service providers. There are several
goals of this paper. The first goal of this paper is to review the existing methods and standards
dealing with information pertaining to public keys, key ownership and key operators. More
specifically, we discuss the use of the existing standards for public key certificates and the
registration services used by certification authorities as a means to obtain originator and
beneficiary information prior to the transfer of virtual assets, thereby providing a compliant
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solution for these new types of service providers [5]. We also discuss the need for virtual
asset service providers to exchange customer information using the existing standards for
attributes or claims. The public key certificates of customers, as well as their attribute
information should be communicated out-of-band (off-chain) between virtual asset service
providers. These topics will be discussed in Section 2 to Section 7.
The second goal of this paper is to propose and discuss the notion of a trust network of
VASPs as a way for the community of VASPs to exchange out-of-band relevant information
regarding their customers and related keys (Section 8). The trust network should be based
on a common operating rules which governs the daily running of the trust network.
Our third goal is to propose a number of areas of innovation for the nascent virtual
assets industry (Section 9). This includes new mechanisms to expand the discoverability and
reachability of VASPs globally. This will allow better connectivity and information sharing
among the various VASPs around the world – in much the same way that ISPs in the Internet
share route and endpoint reachability information among the community of ISPs globally.
2 Virtual Assets and VASPs
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body established in 1989
by the ministers of its member countries or jurisdictions [6]. The objectives of the FATF are
to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational
measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to
the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF is a “policy-making body”
which works to generate the necessary political will to bring about national legislative and
regulatory reforms in these areas.
The FATF has developed a series of Recommendations that are recognized as the inter-
national standard for combating of money laundering and the financing of terrorism and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They form the basis for a coordinated response
to the threats to the integrity of the financial system and help ensure a level playing field.
First issued in 1990, the FATF Recommendations were revised in 1996, 2001, 2003, 2012
and most recently in 2018 to ensure that they remain up to date and relevant, and they are
intended to be of universal application.
With the emergence of blockchain technologies, virtual assets and cryptocurrencies, the
FATF recognized the need to adequately mitigate the money laundering (ML) and terrorist
financing (TF) risks associated with virtual asset activities.
In its most recent Recommendation 15 [7], the FATF defines the following:
• Virtual Asset: A virtual asset is a digital representation of value that can be digitally
traded, or transferred, and can be used for payment or investment purposes. Virtual
assets do not include digital representations of fiat currencies, securities and other
financial assets that are already covered elsewhere in the FATF Recommendations.
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Figure 1: Information transfer between VASPs occurring off-chain (out-of-band)
• Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASP): Virtual asset service provider means any nat-
ural or legal person who is not covered elsewhere under the Recommendations, and
as a business conducts one or more of the following activities or operations for or on
behalf of another natural or legal person: (i) exchange between virtual assets and fiat
currencies; (ii) exchange between one or more forms of virtual assets; (iii) transfer of
virtual assets; (iv) safekeeping and/or administration of virtual assets or instruments
enabling control over virtual assets; and (v) participation in and provision of financial
services related to an issuer’s offer and/or sale of a virtual asset.
In this context of virtual assets, transfer means to conduct a transaction on behalf of an-
other natural or legal person that moves a virtual asset from one virtual asset address or
account to another. Furthermore, to manage and mitigate the risks emerging from virtual
assets, the Recommendations states that countries should ensure that VASPs are regulated
for AML/CFT purposes, and licensed or registered and subject to effective systems for mon-
itoring and ensuring compliance with the relevant measures called for in the FATF Recom-
mendations.
3 The Travel Rule for Virtual Assets on Blockchains
One of the key aspects of the FATF Recommendation 15 is the need for VASPs to retain
information regarding the originator and beneficiaries of virtual asset transfers:
“Countries should ensure that originating VASPs obtain and hold required and
accurate originator information and required beneficiary information on virtual
asset transfers, submit the above information to the beneficiary VASP or financial
institution (if any) immediately and securely, and make it available on request to
appropriate authorities. Countries should ensure that beneficiary VASPs obtain
and hold required originator information and required and accurate beneficiary
information on virtual asset transfers, and make it available on request to ap-
propriate authorities. Other requirements of R.16 (including monitoring of the
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availability of information, and taking freezing action and prohibiting transac-
tions with designated persons and entities) apply on the same basis as set out
in R.16. The same obligations apply to financial institutions when sending or
receiving virtual asset transfers on behalf of a customer” (Paragraph 7(b) of [8]).
The implication of note [8] is that cryptocurrency exchanges and related VASPs must be
able to share the originator and beneficiary information for virtual assets transactions. This
process – also known as the Travel Rule – originates from under the US Bank Secrecy Act
(BSA - 31 USC 5311 - 5330), which mandates that financial institutions deliver certain types
of information to the next financial institution when a funds transmittal event involves more
that one financial institution. This rule became effective in May 1996 and was issued by
the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). This rule was
issued by FinCEN concurrently with the new BSA record keeping rules for funds transfers
and transmittals of funds.
Given that today a virtual asset on blockchain is controlled through the public-private
keys bound to that asset, we believe there are other information (in addition to the customer
and account information) that a VASP needs to retain in order to satisfy the travel rule:
• Key ownership information: This is information pertaining to the legal ownership of
cryptographic public-private keys.
When a customer (e.g. originator) presents their public key to the VASP for the first
time, there must be a “chain of provenance” evidence regarding the customer’s public-
private keys which assures that the customer is the true owner. The point is that just
because an entity can prove possession of the private key, it does not necessarily follow
that the entity is the legal owner of the public-private keys. Proof of possession alone
is insufficient to prove legal ownership. The ability to prove legal ownership of the
public-private keys may be crucial in different types of applications of virtual assets
(e.g. property ownership).
• Key operator information: This is information or evidence pertaining to the legal cus-
tody by a VASP of a customer’s public-private keys.
This information is relevant for a VASP who adopts a key-custody business model
in which the VASP holds and operates the customer’s public-private keys to perform
transaction on behalf of the customer.
Recently there has been several objections on the part of some VASPs to the FATF
Recommendation 15. One argument is that Recommendation 15 ...“presupposes that an
originating VASP has access to other information on the beneficiary apart from the wallet
address, which it does not” [9]. That is, some VASPs believe it is difficult or impossible for
a VASP to obtain information about the owner of a public key, notably when the public key
is the recipient (beneficiary) of an asset transfer on a blockchain.
5
Another argument is that the travel rule requirement ...“can easily be circumvented by in-
terposing peer-to-peer (P2P) transfers or non-custodial wallets, which cannot be stopped” [9].
That is, some VASPs believe that if they are burdened by the travel rule and are forced to
require wallet-holders to reveal their identity information to the VASP (e.g. name, address,
and so on, as normally required for bank accounts), this will force wallet-holders who wish
to remain anonymous to simply use the P2P direct asset transfer outside the regulatory
framework of the FATF.
We believe these arguments are weak at best because of several reasons. Firstly, key-
holders who seek to operate outside the the FATF regulatory framework will continue to do
so in any case. They will continue to use the P2P direct asset transfer (e.g. transmitting
directly from their wallet to the blockchain) regardless of VASPs or the travel rule. Many
of these tech-savvy key-holders have been using the P2P direct asset transfer method since
the inception of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency over a decade ago [1] – before the notion of
crypto-exchanges came to the fore.
Secondly, the nature of virtual assets and the public-private keys bound to those assets
require careful management of those keys (e.g. key storage, backups, retrieval, etc). Loss or
theft of keys means loss of virtual assets. To many individuals seeking to trade in virtual
assets, the management of these keys is too burdensome. We see this as a business opportunity
for VASPs and for the virtual assets ecosystem as a whole. VASPs need to provide business
value to honest holders of virtual assets and provide them with a user-friendly way to trade
in virtual assets.
Thirdly, VASPs need to engage with existing traditional data providers using new business
models as a means to obtain validated information regarding candidate customers. When
an entity seeks to open a new account at a VASP, the VASP could then validate the entity
information against these traditional sources of information. This includes traditional finan-
cial institutions (e.g. credit rating agencies), government institutions (e.g. motor vehicle
registries) and other traditional service providers (e.g. Telco operators).
We believe that the travel rule provides the emerging VASP industry with opportunity
today to develop competitive innovations around the correct identification of owners of virtual
assets and provide them with user-friendly ways to transfers virtual assets at a global scale.
Early attempts to integrate public key certificates to blockchain systems have been made
(e.g. [10, 11]) but more research and development need to be conducted. Rather than weaken
the travel rule to satisfy the short-term needs of a small number of VASPs, governments
and VASP businesses should direct research and development into future infrastructures for
virtual assets, digital identities, public key certification and the safe management of customer
keys. We discuss several possible areas for innovation in Section 9.
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4 VASPs as Virtual Asset Exchanges and Key Operators
In recent years, two popular types of VASPs have emerged, namely centralized exchanges
(CEX) and decentralized exchanges (DEX). A centralized exchange may or may not hold a
customer’s private-key. In the case that it does, we refer to the exchange as a “custodial
exchange” because it has legal custody of the public and private keys. In this case the CEX
uses the customers public-private keys under legal custody to perform (sign) transaction sent
to the cryptocurrency network.
In contrast, some centralized exchanges do not hold a customer’s keys. Instead, it simply
creates an account for the customer in the traditional manner. Here the CEX has one or more
public-private keys of its own which it uses to interact with the cryptocurrency network, and
it is the CEX that controls these keys (not the customer). Furthermore, the CEX simply
commingles all their customers’ funds or virtual assets into one consolidated fund. For the
customer, the custodial CEX approach has the attraction of relieving the customer from
having to manage their cryptographic keys. It also relieves the customer from having to
obtain on their own financial insurance over their virtual assets. The CEX could obtain
insurance over the entire comingled funds.
The notion of a decentralized exchange (DEX) is one where the various functions (e.g. bid,
ask, trade) related to trading is performed the blockchain system itself (e.g. smart contracts
running on nodes of the blockchain). The user employs a wallet (hardware and/or software)
which holds the user’s public-private keys and which performs the signing of transactions
using the private key. Here the user trades directly from their wallets without having to trust
a centralized entity.
Currently the VASP landscape is evolving and as a result there is a degree of confusion
today with regards to the notion and functions of an exchange. As mentioned previously
in Section 3, we believe that the travel rule will necessitate VASPs who operate as either
a centralized exchange to address the issue of retaining key ownership information and key
operator information. This is particularly important for VASPs from a risk exposure man-
agement and virtual assets insurance perspective [12, 13]. Figure 2 attempts to summarize
relationships between VASPS, the originator/beneficiary and the location of keys used to
perform transactions. Note that Figure 2 (a1), (b1) and (c1) are symmetrical in that there
is an Originator-VASP and a Beneficiary-VASP. In contrast, Figure 2 (a2), (b2) and (c2) are
asymmetrical in that there are no Beneficiary-VASP present.
• VASP mediated asset transfers: In this model the customer holds their public-private
keys while the VASP holds a copy of the customer’s public key only (not their private
key). This model may be suitable for customers who seek the mediation of the VASP
in asset transfers (e.g. for legal purposes) but who may not wish to provide the VASP
with the customer’s private key. This is represented in Figure 2 (a1) and (a2).
• VASP key-custody asset transfers: In this model, the VASPs holds custody of the
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Figure 2: VASPs as virtual asset exchanges and key operators
customers’ public-private keys. Upon instruction from the customer, the VASP signs
transactions on behalf of the customer using the customer’s private key. This is repre-
sented in Figure 2 (b1) and (b2).
• VASP-key commingled asset transfers: In this model, the VASP uses its own public-
private keys to perform virtual asset transfers. This is represented in Figure 2 (c1) and
(c2).
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Multiple asset transfers instances could be merge into a single transaction, thereby
saving the Originator-VASP some transmission cost (e.g. gas fee). The beneficiaries
information must still be communicated by the Originator-VASP to the Beneficiary-
VASP out-of-band.
• User direct P2P asset transfers: In this case, the originator and the beneficiary transacts
directly on the blockchain using their respective keys (i.e. directly from their wallets).
This is represented in Figure 2 (d). Here the user burdens the risk of key loss and thus
the risk of losing their virtual assets. VASPs are not present in this situation.
Note that combinations of models represented by Figure 2 (a1), (b1) and (c1) can be achieved.
For example, on the sending side the originator entity could be holding its public-private keys
as shown on the left side of Figure 2 (a1), while on the receiving side the beneficiary entity
could be using a key-custody service offered by the Beneficiary-VASP as shown on the right
side of Figure 2 (b1). Although not shown in Figure 2, customers may be using other public-
private keys to establish a secure and authenticated channel between the customer and the
respective VASP. In the remainder of this paper we will not discuss these auxiliary keys, and
focus solely on keys that are used to transfers virtual assets on the blockchain (i.e. the public
keys that recorded on the confirmed transactions on the ledger).
5 Public Key Certificates and the Travel Rule
One of the fundamental challenges of public-key cryptography since its inception in 1978
[14, 15] is that of proving ownership of a given public key. When two parties sign a contract
or exchange signed messages, both parties need assurance that they are employing the correct
public keys belonging to the respective parties (i.e. not stolen from another user). They also
need the feature of non-repudiation, meaning that a signer must be deterred or prevented
from cheating by way of claiming – after a contract has just been signed – that their private
key was stolen before the contract was signed (e.g. thereby repudiating the signing of the
contract). In the context of the travel rule (Paragraph 7(b) of [8]) VASPs will need to retain
evidence of key ownership for compliance purposes. The existing standards pertaining to
public key certificates may provide the basis for VASPs to record information regarding the
ownership of public keys related to virtual assets.
In the late 1990s the computer industry developed the notion of public key ownership
registration and certification [16]. The idea of registration and certification is to unambigu-
ously determine the legal ownership of a public key, and therefore provide the recipient of
a signed contract or message with a degree of assurance – for business risk assessment – of
the true identity of the signer (the owner of the public-private keys). The goal was to estab-
lish a public key framework [17, 18] that allowed for legal interpretation to be created atop
the framework, where roles, responsibilities and liabilities would be unambiguously identified
9
version
serialNumber
signature
issuer
validity
subject
subjectPublicKeyInfo
extensions
signatureAlgorithm
signatureValue
The version of the specification used (e.g. X.509 version 2 or 3)
The unique serial number of this certificate
The signature algorithm-identifier employed for this certificate
The Certification Authority (issuer) who issued & signed this certificate
The validity duration of this certificate (not before; not after)
The subject (user) who “owns” or holds the matching private-key
The public-key of the subject (user)
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The digital signature Certification Authority (issuer)
Figure 3: Summary of X.509 (v3) certificates (after [21, 22])
and risks allocated. The notion of a public key framework paved the way for the eventual
establishment of the e-Signature Act in year 2000 [19].
In contrast, around the same time. some in industry sought to develop “self-certification”
for public keys in which the key owner would self-declare their ownership to friends and family
in a “web of trust” model (e.g. PGP [20]). However, in the context of business transactions
self-certification came to be viewed as having little or no value, and as such the “web of trust”
philosophy failed to gain adoption in the business community.
In order to understand why public key certificates are core to conducting business on
the Internet, it is important to understand the notion of technical trust and business trust.
In order for two transacting parties to obtain assurance of each other’s key ownership, a
neutral trusted third party is needed to “ vouch” for key ownerships of the respective parties
– by way of performing ownership registration and certification of public keys. This trusted
third party is referred to as the Certification Authority (CA), and the result of certification
is a data structure referred to as Public Key Certificates, typically employing the X.509
standard format. A certification authority issues an X.509 certificate by digitally signing
the certificate using its own private key. By signing it, the certification authority legally
attests to the truthfulness of its assertion that the public key listed in the X.509 certificate is
owned by the subject (person or organization) listed in the same certificate (see Figure 3).
One can therefore say that a certification authority “binds” a given public key to its owner
(the subject). The overall goal of a certification authority issuing (signing) a public key
certificate under a given public key framework is to support the correct identification of the
subject and indirectly provide the basis for the chain of provenance of the public key [23].
The standard protocols and formats related to public key certificates is the X.509 public key
standard [24, 25, 26] (ISO/IEC 9594-8). Figure 3 summarizes the typical X.509 public key
certificate. The JSON-based format is defined in [27].
The certification authority itself asserts the ownership of its public key in the form of
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Figure 4: Overview of Certification Authority (CA) services
a root certificate using the same X.509 certificate standard. The X.509 root certificate is
typically self-signed by the certification authority using its private key (matching the public
key stated in the root certificate) [28]. In order to prevent the certification authority from
cheating by way of modifying the root public-private keys, the root certificate is typically
made available to the broad community in numerous ways. This can be achieved, for example,
by publishing the root certificate in newspapers and bulletins, by shipping copies inside
browsers, by inclusion in hardware, and so on. In this way the certification authority is
prevented from repudiating or falsifying its own self-signed root certificate.
As a neutral trusted third party, a certification authority operates services pertaining to
the registration, certification and revocation of public-key ownership (Figure 4). As a legal
business entity, a commercial certification authority must publish (e.g. on its website) a
service level agreement (SLA) pertaining to these services. This service agreement is referred
to in industry as the Certificate Practices Statement (CPS) [29, 30]. Prior to registering
their public key to a given certification authority, a key owner (subject) must review the
CPS document belonging to that certification authority and determine whether the terms of
the service in the CPS (e.g. key management procedures, liabilities, warranties for key loss,
etc) are acceptable to the key owner. Some example of CPS statements can be found in [31]
(Symantec/VeriSign) and [32] (Apple).
Over the years there has been misunderstandings regarding the notion of the public key
infrastructure (PKI) and regarding the expectations from such a service infrastructure. One
recurring complaint has been the “centralized” nature of the certification authority. The
fear is that a certification authority may have too much control over transactions between
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the subject (key owner) and the relying party, allowing it to revoke certificates without
sufficient reason, thereby rendering the key owner powerless. We believe this main criticism
misunderstands the role of the certification authority as a neutral trusted third party with
legal and financial liabilities.
More specifically, both the subject (party) and the counter-party in a transaction must
rely on the correct operations of the certification authority and on its legal underpinnings
as a business. For risk management purposes, both parties require a single entity (i.e. the
certification authority) to take-on legal responsibility and liabilities in the case that (i) er-
rors exist in the public-key certificate; (ii) in the case where the certification authority fails
to revoke within reasonable time a certificate corresponding to a stolen or lost private-key
(leading to ambiguity of the status of a signed contract); and (iii) in the case that one or
more of its services fails, impacting loss on the part of either party (e.g. a valid certificate was
revoked by mistake). Thus, the certification authority represents centralized responsibility.
Both parties in the transaction need this centralized responsibility in order to manage risks.
They need assurance that “the buck stops” at the certification authority should certificate
related errors or service failures occur.
Despite these misunderstandings the X.509 standard for public key certificates has been
successful at a broad scale over the past two decades. This is because in the current age of the
open Internet the public key infrastructure based on the X.509 standard addresses the acute
need of business trust based on legal trust founded on the CPS contract (SLA), which is in
turn built upon the technical trust afforded by the X.509 key management framework. Service
contracts that carry monetary liabilities to the service operator can only be economically
viable to the operator and acceptable to customers when the technical foundation of the
services has been well understood and has been clearly defined by sound technical standards.
Any effort to replace the X.509 standard will need to contend with these three aspects of
trust (business trust, legal trust and technical trust).
Today X.509 certificates are ubiquitous across different markets, verticals and applica-
tions. The X.509 certificates are used extensively within banking and finance [33, 34], in
defense and military networks [35], in government and federal systems [18, 36], and within
many consumer electronic products (e.g. PC computers [37, 38], TPM hardware on lap-
tops [39, 40], smartphones [37], USIM smartcards [41], cable-modems [42], etc). They are
used extensively within routers, VPNs and other network elements. Today in the networking
industry the Virtual Private Network (VPN) sub-segment alone is forecasted to reach 70
billion dollars in the next few years. Most, if not all, websites today employ one or more
X.509 certificates (of varying qualities) for SSL connections, and billions of SSL connections
are made every day from the user’s browsers to the various certificate-enabled websites.
In the context of VASPs and virtual assets bound to public keys, there are at least two
approaches that VASPs can adopt with the regards to public key certificates as a means to
prove key ownership (Figure 5):
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Figure 5: Role of certification authority for key ownership for virtual assets
• VASP outsources customer public-key certification to a CA: In this approach, a VASP
outsources the tasks relating to its customer’s public key certificates to an external
(commercial) certification authority. This approach allows a VASP to focus on its
primary business, leveraging the expertise of the certification authority. All public key
certificate management tasks, including certificate revocation, are performed by the
external certification authority.
Here, when an entity (individual or organization) seeks to open an account at the VASP
accompanied by its public key (see Figure 2 (a1) and (a2)), the VASP can redirect
the entity to the external certification authority with whom the VASP has a business
relationship. After the entity has been successfully issued with an X.509 certificate for
its public key, the certification authority can provide a copy of this certificate to the
VASP. A similar approach can be used for VASPs which adopt a key-custody model, in
which the VASP request a public key certificate for each customer key in its custody.
Identification information collated by the external certification authority for the en-
rolling subject can be shared with the VASP, thereby aiding the VASP in its efforts to
comply to the travel rule.
• VASP becomes a public-key certification authority: In this approach, the VASP itself
becomes a certification authority for its customer’s public key certificates. This ap-
proach may be attainable by a VASP depending on its business needs and on the size
of its customer base. However, all the complex certificate management tasks must be
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performed by the VASP.
A third possible approach is a blend between the above, in which a hosted certification
authority approach is used. Here the certificate related services are operated by a commercial
certification authority, but the issuance of the certificates and key management is under the
full control of the VASPs. In this case the VASP takes-on the legal liabilities as the customer-
facing certification authority.
6 Off-Chain Exchange of Customer Information between VASPs
For virtual asset transfers, the travel rule requires that originating VASPs obtain and hold
the required and accurate originator information, and the required beneficiary information.
They are also required to submit this information to the beneficiary VASP and make it
available upon request to appropriate authorities (see Paragraph 7(b) of [8]). Traditionally,
these include the originator’s name, account number, address, the identity of the Originator-
VASP, the amount, execution date, and the identity of the Beneficiary-VASP. Additionally,
the side of the Beneficiary-VASP, for incoming asset transfers the VASP must obtain and hold
information regarding the beneficiary’s name, account number, address and other beneficiary
identifiers.
In the context of blockchain systems as the medium of transaction using public keys, the
scope of information regarding the customer (originator and beneficiary) must now include
their public key information – or what is referred to as the “address” in the blockchain lit-
erature (e.g. Bitcoin [1]). As we suggested in Section 3, this account information must now
include (i) key ownership information and (ii) key operator information for the customer’s
public key used on the blockchain. As further discussed in Section 4 and as illustrated in Fig-
ure 2, an Originator-VASP must retain key ownership information and key operator informa-
tion for (a) the Originator-VASP itself, (b) the originator customer, (c) the Beneficiary-VASP,
and (d) the beneficiary customer.
There are several aspects related to the collection of customer information in the context
of public keys:
• Customer information collected at the time certificate creation: Customer information
must be collected prior to the issuance of their public key certificates. Certification
authorities commonly require customers (subjects) – whether individuals or organiza-
tions – to submit the required information in the Registration phase of the certificate
management lifecycle [24, 36, 16]. This is shown as Step 1 in Figure 4. During this
phase it is the main task of the certification authority to perform identity verification
(of the subject) enrolling for the certificate.
• Standardized certificate classes based on customer information provenance: Over the
last two decade several certification authorities (CA) have develop the notion of class
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or grades of public key certificates that reflects the confidence in the accuracy and prove-
nance of the information regarding the customer to whom the certificate was issued.
The classes or grades of certificates issued by a certification authority is commonly
described in the Certificate Practices Statement (CPS) [29, 30] of that certification
authority.
As an emerging industry, VASPs can collectively define the notion of classes of cer-
tificates for their industry based on the required customer identification information
and confidence level during the customer registration phase. A standard definition of
certificate classes for the VASP industry allows VASPs to require (demand) that cer-
tification authorities fulfill the relevant customer identity verifications and report this
information and level of confidence to the VASP as part of the service agreement.
• VASP collation of customer identity information from the certification authority: In the
case where a VASP outsources the issuance of certificates to an external certification
authority (CA), the VASP must obtain a copy of the customer identity information
from the certification authority and retain it as part of customer due diligence (CDD)
for compliance to the travel rule.
In fact, this is one reason why we believe the emerging VASP community will benefit
from closely collaborating with the long-established CA industry around the world.
Most major certification authorities have established robust work-flows for the customer
registration phase of the certificate issuance process.
• Refusal of customers without certificates or uncertain identities: In order to comply
to the requirements of the travel rule, a VASP should simply deny customer requests
for virtual asset transfers when the customer does not posses a certificate issued by a
known reliable certification authority, or when the issuing certification authority has
only low-assurance (low confidence) information regarding the customer.
• Certificate validation prior to virtual asset transfer: Prior to a virtual asset transfer,
an Originator-VASP must perform certificate validation of the public-key certificates of
(i) the originator customer (the customer of the Originator-VASP), (ii) the Beneficiary-
VASP, and (iii) the beneficiary customer (the customer of the Beneficiary-VASP). This
is discussed further in Section 7.
• Customer information communicated out-of-band between VASPs: As mentioned in
Section 2 and illustrated in Figure 1, VASPs should exchange customer information
and customer certificates (and their own VASP certificates) out-of-band over a secure
and authenticated channel. Here, the VASP industry can standardize the APIs and
connection-endpoint definitions to allow inter-VASP exchange of customer information
in a fast and efficient manner prior to the virtual asset transfer. This is discussed
further in Section 8.
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Figure 6: Representation of customer information in attributes assertion
• Standardization of customer attribute information: The VASP industry should define
and profile the customer (subject) data-items required under the travel rule to be
exchanged between VASPs as part of any virtual asset transfer event. We refer to
these data items as the attributes of the originator, beneficiary and their corresponding
VASPs.
There are several standards in existence to represent attribute information of a subject
(e.g. individual or organization) and protocols which support the delivery of these
attributes securely in the open Internet of today. Examples include the X.509 Attribute
Certificate [43], the XML Security Assertions Mark-up Language (SAML) [44], the
OpenID Identity Token [45] and the recent JSON-based Verifiable Claims [46].
Following the travel rule, there are several aspects related to the exchange of customer
information and attributes between an Originator-VASP and Beneficiary-VASP:
• Digitally signed by the VASP: The attribute assertion or claim regarding a customer of
a VASP must be digitally signed by the VASP. This is done as a means by the VASP
to attest the truthfulness of the information in the assertion or claim.
• Linking to customer public key certificate: A VASP that issues signed attribute assertion
or claim about a customer (subject) must link the attribute structure to the public key
certificate of the customer.
This linking can be achieved by including a cryptographic hash of the customer’s public
key certificate within the assertion data structure. Figure 6 illustrates this association
using the X.509 attribute certificates notation.
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Figure 7: Validating a public key certificate at its issuing certification authority (after [49])
• Preservation of subject (customer) privacy: In order to safeguard customer privacy,
VASPs should limit the information exchanged to that required by the travel rule
and to adhere to privacy regulations (e.g. GDPR [47]) when maintaining customer
information. We believe there is an opportunity for the emerging VASP industry to
define and standardize the customer privacy requirements of the VASP industry as a
whole. We discuss this further in Section 9.
When VASPs exchange attribute information out-of-band, they must employ confiden-
tiality measures or mechanisms (e.g. encryption) end-to-end. Standard protocols such
as SSL or TLS [48] which are used billions of times each day on the Internet provides
a good basis to establish a secure and confidential channel between VASPs.
7 VASP Verification of Beneficiary Public Key Certificates
As we mentioned previously, an Originator-VASP needs to validate all relevant pubic key
certificates prior to virtual asset transfer. This is because any errors related to the destination
public keys or about the subject identities can have dramatic impact on the VASP from both
an economic and regulatory compliance perspective.
Unlike wire transfers in correspondent banking, transactions on a blockchain systems such
as Bitcoin [1] is “permanent” (or “immutable” as commonly stated) in the sense that once it is
confirmed the transaction remains in the recorded blocks (ledger) of the blockchain system.
This means that an erroneous asset transfer transaction cannot be canceled, reversed or
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removed from the ledgers of the blockchain system once the transaction has been confirmed.
This lack of a multi-phase commitment scheme [50] means that a mistake or error in an asset
transfer to a Beneficiary-VASP requires the Beneficiary-VASP to return the asset in a separate
transaction on the blockchain. It is worth noting that currently most wallets and blockchain
systems generally do not employ a phased commitment model in which a “pre-commit” phase
is followed by a “final-commit” phase in the sense of classical transactional database system.
Systems such as Hyperledger Fabric [51] employ Orderers and Endorsers nodes that create
temporary read/write sets prior to finalizing the read/write set of transactions. However,
this process occurs as part of the consensus-making cycle and is outside the control of the
the sender or receiver VASPs.
The implication here is that in order to avoid errors in virtual asset transfers, in addi-
tion to verifying user account information an Originator-VASP must validate the origin and
destination public keys of the parties prior to broadcasting the transaction to the blockchain
system.
However, there are other circumstances that may complicate this validation process:
• Originator possesses only its uncertified public-key: Many cryptocurrency users today
employ a digital wallet (software and/or hardware) that holds only the user’s own
public-private key and the public keys (“addresses”) of other users. As such, there are
cases where the originator customer may not as yet posses a certificate for their public
key.
If the originator is a customer of the VASP, one possible course of action is for the VASP
to redirect the customer to enroll for a public key certificate following the standard
X.509 enrollment process. This enrollment can be done by the VASP itself if the VASP
is a certification authority. Alternatively, the VASP can redirect its customer to a
commercial certification authority with whom the VASP has a business relationship.
• Originator possesses public key certificate: In the case that the customer provides a
copy of their public key certificate, the VASP must validate the certificate status to
the issuing certificate authority. The X.509 standard has protocols to perform this
validation in an efficient manner [52, 49].
• Originator possesses only the uncertified public key of the beneficiary: Similar to the
previous scenario, an originator customer of a VASP may only be in possession (i.e. in
their wallet) of the public key of the beneficiary, without a corresponding certificate.
In this case, the Originator-VASP has the task of searching for the beneficiary’s cer-
tificate among other VASPs or certificate authorities. Typically X.509 certificates can
be fetched from the issuer service via a standardized endpoint (e.g. URI for certifi-
cates) [53, 54].
• Originator only knows the beneficiary account information: In this scenario, the origina-
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tor customer may only be in possession of the beneficiary’s name and account number,
and possibly the name of the destination VASP.
In this case, the Originator-VASP has the task of inquiring to the Beneficiary-VASP
about the account of the beneficiary at that VASP using traditional means.
Figure 7 illustrates the case where an Originator-VASP obtains a copy of a certificate
based on a beneficiary public key given by an originator customer. The originator customer
does not posses the public key certificate of the beneficiary but only their public key (Step 1
of Figure 7). The Originator-VASP submits the beneficiary public key to the relevant certi-
fication authority (Step 2), who searches through its database of certificates. When a match
is found, the certification authority return the certificate of the beneficiary customer to the
Originator-VASP (in Step 3). The certification authority may also return additional known
attributes of the customer as part of the response to the Originator-VASP. If the retuned cer-
tificate of the beneficiary is valid and the returned attributes contains sufficient information
that allows the Originator-VASP to decide based on risk analysis, the Originator-VASP may
proceed with the virtual asset transfer.
In order to prevent an Originator-VASP from querying every known certification authority
in the world – an approach that is not only impractical but vastly inefficient – one potential
solution is for the community of VASPs and their respective certification authorities to form
a trust network that shares known good public keys and share certificate revocation lists.
This topic will be discussed further in Section 8.
8 Towards a Trust Network of VASPs
The Internet has been successful over the past three decades because of a number of sound
architecture designs. One architecture design decision was to allow organizations to own and
operate portions of the Internet as autonomous systems, allowing each autonomous system
to runs its own interior routing protocol with its own network topology for their network ele-
ments (e.g. routers, bridges, etc.). Each autonomous system would be allocated unique iden-
tifier (i.e. AS number) and each autonomous system would represent independent networks
(e.g. LANs, WANS, backhaul networks, etc) owned and operated by various independent
entities (e.g. ISPs, universities, governments, military, etc). Thus, the Internet of today is in
reality composed of numerous autonomous systems that are “stitched” together, presenting to
the user end-to-end IP connectivity. Autonomous systems employ peering agreements or con-
tracts among themselves in order to negotiate IP traffic volumes and routing patterns. These
agreements permit each autonomous system to advertise routes that are available through
that autonomous system, resulting in the reachability of (most) IP addresses globally.
Similarly, the SWIFT banking network that begun in the 1970s as a messaging network
for sharing bank and account information has evolved over the past three decades into a
global network that employs IP-based messaging (SwiftNet). Instead of employing pair-wise
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Figure 8: Trust Network of VASPs sharing customer certificates and attributes
(bilateral) key exchanges, it has also adopted public key certificates as a more scalable solution
for end-to-end entity authentication of members of the network [55, 34].
We believe that in order to solve the various issues around the travel rule and challenges in
obtaining of originator/beneficiary customer information, it is in the best interest of VASPs
to collectively establish a VASP trust network in a manner similar to the ISP community on
the Internet (Figure 8).
Some of the fundamental requirements of a VASP trust network are as follows:
• VASP-only network: The VASP trust network should allow the exchange out-of-band
of relevant customer-related information as well as blockchain-transaction details. The
trust network among others should include a technical public key framework, a common
definition of services and interfaces and a legal framework (system rules definition) for
all its membership.
The trust network could also deploy a VASP-only blockchain system for the purposes of
common audit and reporting. Depending on the design of this VASP-only blockchain,
hashes of the latest list of known good public keys (and pointers to their file locations)
could be captured periodically on this blockchain.
• Independence from asset transfer blockchains: The VASP trust network must be inde-
pendent of any blockchain system as the medium of virtual asset transfers. Like the
Internet routing autonomous systems, in the future there will be dozens to hundreds
of blockchain systems operating around the world (e.g. for different types of virtual
assets), presenting several challenges for blockchain interoperability [56]. As an emerg-
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Figure 9: Global interconnection of multiple VASP trust networks
ing industry VASPs must ensure that their trust network architecture can interoperate
with any and all future asset transfer blockchains.
• VASP-to-VASP secure channels based on VASP public key certificates: In order to have
the ability to quickly establish secure and authenticated channel pair-wise between
VASPs in the trust network, the members of the trust network should each posses
public-private keys and a certificate solely for interacting on the trust network. The
use of certificates simplifies the task of communicating the public keys of members of
the trust network. In the case that the trust network employs a VASP-only blockchain
system, then separate public-private keys must be used for that blockchain system.
Some VASPs today are already employing X.509 certificates for protecting SSL connec-
tions from the customers browser to the VASP service platform. However, this minimal
use of SSL certificates needs to be enhanced (e.g. end-to-end integration with customer
wallets, validation of chains of certificates and attribute claims, cross-VASP certificate
queries, etc.).
A trust network of VASPs enables and promotes virtual asset transfers globally in the
following ways:
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• Synchronization of blockchain transactions to customer identity: The use of a trust net-
work running parallel to the asset-transactions blockchain allows an Originator-VASP
to communicate to the Beneficiary-VASP ahead of the transaction on the blockchain.
The tight synchronization between the customer information sent through the trust
network and the asset transaction on the blockchain provides the foundation for (i)
post-event auditing/reconciliation, and (ii) evidence for conflict-resolution and among
VASPs who are members of the rust network.
For example, for commingled virtual asset transfers intended for multiple individual
beneficiaries, the Originator-VASP can transmit a list of the intended amounts and
beneficiaries (recipients) through the trust network. This provides some time (e.g. a
few seconds) for the Beneficiary-VASP to validate that all the destined beneficiaries are
known to the Beneficiary-VASP and are not on the list of suspect accounts.
• Exchange of information about active and revoked customer certificates: VASPs who are
members of the trust network can exchange with each other some minimal information
regarding the public key certificates of their respective customers.
An example of this minimal information could be the serial numbers (of the certificates)
or the public key themselves (without certificates). This list of known good serial
numbers and public keys could be shared (broadcasted) securely with members of the
trust network on a regular basis (e.g. hourly or overnight) based on a push/pull model
(e.g. over a RESTful API [54]). This allows one VASP to query another VASP in the
trust network, submitting only the serial numbers or the public keys over a point-to-
point secure channel (e.g. SSL).
Thus, when an originator customers provides the Originator-VASP with a destination
beneficiary public key (which the Originator-VASP may have never seen before), the
Originator-VASP can search through its copy of the list of known good public keys in the
trust network and query the corresponding VASP in the trust network that advertised
knowledge of the matching certificate. Similarly, the trust network of VASPs should pe-
riodically (e.g. hourly, overnight) exchange the certificate revocation list (CRL) [57, 25]
among the members of the trust network using the existing X.509 standard protocols.
• Exchange of signed assertions about customers: When an Originator-VASP queries
another VASP in the trust network and obtains a valid copy of the public key certificate
of a customer of that VASP, the Originator-VASP has the option to further query
that VASP for additional account information regarding the customer of that VASP.
There are several standard protocols that can be used to deliver customer information
assertions or claims (e.g. SAML [44] and OIDC [45] are used extensively in various
identity provider communities).
The point here is that the initial sharing of minimal information (e.g. serial number
of certificate, or public key of a customer) among the VASPs in the trust network
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allows a VASP to focus subsequent deeper queries to a single (or few) specific VASP
for obtaining the beneficiary customer information. This increases the efficiency of the
network and the reduces the response time experienced by an Originator-VASP.
• Global interconnection of multiple VASP trust networks: In order for the VASP in-
dustry to scale-up their services towards a global customer base, the trust network of
VASPs need to be interconnected in the same manner that autonomous systems are
interconnected together based on ISP peering contracts. A global interconnection of
multiple VASP trust networks allows a VASP in one trust network (domain) to obtain
“clues” as to the existence of another VASP in different trust network (foreign domain)
who may be in possession of information relating to a destination customer public key.
For example, in Figure 9, the VASP at point (a) in Trust Network 1 who is seeking to
fulfill an asset transfer request from the originator in Trust Network 1 to a beneficiary in
Trust Network 3 may obtain reachability knowledge about a remote VASP at point (d)
within in Trust Network 3. The expectation is that the VASP at point (d) may posses
the public key certificate and assertions regarding the beneficiary (who is expected to
be a customer of that remote VASP).
This reachability information can be “advertised” from the VASPs in Trust Network 3
into the VASPs at Trust Network 1 through the peering points at VASP (b) and
VASP (c). That is, the Originator-VASP at point (a) hears about Beneficiary-VASP at
point (d) because of the “route advertisements” (i.e. list of public keys known in Trust
Network 3) was shared through VASP peering points at VASPs (b) and (c).
9 Areas for Innovation
There are several areas of innovation where VASPs as an emerging industry can take leader-
ship and define the next-generation infrastructure for the global virtual assets commerce.
9.1 Operating Rules for the Trust Network of VASPs
Following from the discussion of VASP trust networks in Section 8, one area of innovation
for the virtual assets and VASPs industry is the development of a common set of operating
rules suitable for the VASP industry.
Similar to other organizations (e.g. NACHA [58], Visa [59], OIX [60]) the operating
rules for the VASP trust network describe a legally enforceable set rules and agreements
that govern the day-to-day running of the trust network as a multi-party system established
to achieve common purpose of its members. In the case of the trust network of VASPs,
these common purposes include the sharing of: (i) VASP entity information, (ii) customer
information, (iii) key ownership information, (iv) key operator information, and (v) VASP
reachability parameters. These operating rules must be founded on a common set of business
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requirements and technical specifications. This in turn allows each member of the trust
network to obtain assurance that each of the other participants will follow the same set of
rules, defined for their particular role in the trust network.
A good operating rules for a VASP trust network provides its members with the several
benefits. First, it provides a means for the members to improve risk management because the
operating rules will allow members to quantify and manage risks inherent in participating
within the trust network. Secondly, the operating rules provides its members with legal
certainty and predictability by addressing the legal rights, responsibilities, and liabilities of
the participants in the trust network. Because the operating rules is a legal agreement, it is
legally enforceable upon all members. Thirdly, the operating rules provides transparency to
the members of the VASP trust network by making the terms of the agreements, technical
specifications (e.g. APIs, minimal performance delivery, etc), and other member business
rules – comprising the operating rules – accessible to all participants.
There are several business drivers for establishing a VASP trust network. Beyond the
basic set of services that members must implement to be part of the trust network, each
member is free to offer product/service differentiation in the market while complying to
the operating rules. This in turn allows a VASP to broaden market adoption by enhancing
these basic services with better features (e.g. faster response, richer customer information set,
better privacy protection for customer information, etc). From the cost-reduction perspective,
standardizing the technical functions across all services of members of the trust network allows
for reusability of components (e.g. share common set of APIs and software libraries) and more
efficient compliance adherence, thus having the overall effect of lowering costs for all members
and their respective customers.
9.2 Certificate Profiles and CPS for VASP Trust Network
An important part of the operating rules of the VASP trust network is the standardization of
common technical solutions relevant to the shared goals of the trust network. For example,
in relation to the questions of key ownership information and key operator information,
the members should develop a common certificate practices statement (CPS) and certificate
profile (CP) for the public key certificates within the trust network. The operating rules
should define all aspects and phases of public-key management lifecycle for all members of
the VASP trust network.
There are several technical decisions regarding the certificate features that can be defined
or expressed through the certificate profile. For example, the certificate profile could narrow
the permitted usage of the public-private keys to that of signatures only (not encryption).
Additional VASP-specific extension could be defined that may limit usage of the public-
private keys to only specific blockchain systems (e.g. can be used to sign transactions only
for the Bitcoin network).
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9.3 Expanding the Discoverability & Reachability of VASPs
Following from Section 8, there are several possible areas of innovation pertaining to the
exchange of VASP-related information – within a trust network (intra-network as shown in
Figure 8) and across trust networks (inter-network as shown in Figure 9) – for the purpose of
expanding the discoverability and reachability of VASPs. The ability for a VASP to broadcast
a query to the trust network in search for a public key certificate of a beneficiary represents an
innovative function that promotes scaling of VASP services. Queries should lead to responses
that indicate whether an originator/beneficiary is associated with a VASP within the local
trust network, or with a VASP in a different trust network.
Standard protocols exist today to allow access to certificate stores via a HTTP/SSL
connection [54]. However, additional technical extension need to be developed that allow
VASPs in a trust network to exchange lists of serial numbers (or valid certificates) as well
as list of public keys. These periodic exchanges or broadcasts in the trust network can be
based on incremental changes – so called “deltas” (akin to Delta CRLs in [25]) – in order to
minimize bandwidth consumption.
A given VASP may belong to multiple trust networks, or it may have a bilateral business
agreement with another VASP in a different trust network. These VASPs could become
“gateways” to allow certificate-related information to flow from one trust network into another
trust network, thereby increasing the “reach” of the cross-network services as a whole.
9.4 Anonymous-Verifiable Identities and Public keys in the Trust Network
Further research and development should be devoted to a class of cryptographic schemes
that support a capability which we refer to informally as anonymous but verifiable identities
(public keys) with “selective disclosure” features. This capability could be made available to
customers of VASPs who are members of a VASP trust network with legally-binding operating
rules. Here the cryptographic scheme should allow an customer to posses a single private key
bound to multiple public-keys in such a way that the public keys are unlinkable to each other
when viewed by external entities. Thus, when these public keys are used on a blockchain sys-
tem, it should be computationally difficult (infeasible) to deduce a mathematical connection
among these public keys. The holder of such keys can prove it is a legitimate member of the
group (i.e. member of the trust network). We outline such an anonymous-verifiable scheme
for blockchain systems in [61, 62].
There are several variants of anonymous-verifiable cryptographic identity schemes (e.g. [63,
64, 65]). Generally, for the application to virtual assets and VASPs, some desirable properties
are as follows:
• VASP trust network as group: In order for one VASP in a trust network to have the
capacity to recognize an anonymous-verifiable public key wielded by a customer of an-
other VASP in the trust network, all VASPs must collaborate as a group supporting
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the anonymous-verifiable scheme of choice and share the relevant cryptographic param-
eters. Depending on the specific scheme deployed, there might be multiple overlays of
the same scheme (each with different parameters) within the same VASP trust network.
• Parameter issuance from VASP member (Issuer-VASP): In order for a customer to par-
ticipate in the anonymous-verifiable identity scheme, the customer must be registered
at one of the VASPs who is a member of the trust network implementing the scheme.
This VASP – referred to as the Issuer-VASP – will provide its customers with the unique
relevant cryptographic parameters that would allow the customer to transact on the
blockchain with other customers of VASPs in the same trust network in an anonymous
but verifiable manner.
Incorporated into these cryptographic parameters is the ability for the customer to sub-
sequently prove in an anonymous fashion their legitimate participation (i.e. member-
ship) in the anonymous-verifiable identity scheme deployed in the VASP trust network.
• Sharing of member-verification keys among VASPs (Verifier-VASPs): The VASPs in
the trust network must exchange the relevant member-verification keys so that a cus-
tomer of a VASP can anonymously prove to other VASPs in the same trust network
that the customer is a legitimate customer. These Verifier-VASPs must be able to
validate the membership of a customer in an independent manner.
• Customer provable membership to the trust network: A given customer must be able
to prove to any VASP in the same trust network that the customer is a legitimate
customer (of a member VASP) in an anonymous fashion, without needing to disclose
the customer’s Issuer-VASP.
• Legally enforceable registrant disclosure for specific transactions: When a customer is
challenged with regards to a given transaction on the blockchain (e.g. legal warrant
for a suspicious transaction), the customer and/or their Issuer-VASP must be able to
reveal the customer’s true identity (e.g. to a legal court) for that one transaction only,
while at the same time protecting the anonymity of the other transactions belonging
to that customer.
We believe these anonymous-verifiable schemes can be a potential middle-ground solution
between the need of customers to transact anonymously on the blockchain and the need for
compliance to the travel rule.
10 Conclusions
In order for the emerging virtual assets industry to develop and evolve services that are
globally accessible, virtual assets service providers need to work collaboratively to create the
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next generation infrastructures that are not only compliant to the existing FATF regulatory
framework but also provide innovative solutions to customers globally.
Virtual assets service providers need to develop a trust network following the principles of
the Internet architecture, allowing the exchange of customer certificates and attributes that
provide transparency into the movement of virtual assets. The use of existing standards for
public key certificates provides a starting point for this trust network. These standards can
be extended to incorporate features that are specific to virtual assets and to customers of the
service providers. The overall goal is to enable originators and beneficiaries around the world
to exchange virtual assets in user-friendly and seamless manner, compliant to regulations
pertaining to combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation.
As part of developing the next generation infrastructure the virtual assets industry should
invest in research and development in several areas of innovation. These areas of innovation
include the development of the operating rules of the VASP trust network, information sharing
within the trust network and across trust networks, and development of new cryptographic
schemes that solve the need of customer anonymity while complying to the requirements of
the travel rule.
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